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the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Marshall was sim-
ply "there," as Holmes put it, when those cases which turned on the 
meaning of the Constitution presented themselves. When Marshall 
said, as he frequently did in his opinions, that he had no choice but 
to interpret the Constitution, perhaps we ought to pay attention. In 
any case, it was not Marshall alone who did the interpreting, since 
by his own admission, the deliberations of the Court were collective. 
Reasoning exclusively from appellate decisions, without benefit of 
private correspondence of any sort (even John Marshall's), is sure 
to miss the point. 
Placing Marshall and the Court in the larger context of histori-
cal change, which is the gravamen of my argument, permits us to 
see that judicial review, as it unfolds from Marbury to McCulloch v. 
Maryland and beyond, was not born as a Platonic idea in the mind 
of the Chief Justice; nor did the transformation of judicial review 
during his tenure take place unbeknownst to contemporaries. For 
all of his prescient insight, he was, like other statesmen of the 
founding period, forced to learn on the job. His view of judicial 
review changed in response to a wide range of historical changes of 
a fundamental nature: the rise of a national market, the appearance 
of sectional nationalism after the War of 1812, and particularly the 
emergence of a states' rights constitutionalism that challenged Mar-
shall and the Court at every tum. The powerful anti-court move-
ment of the 1820s-the granddaddy of all subsequent such 
movements-makes it clear that the changes in the status of the 
Court which were taking place under Marshall's astute leadership 
were well known. 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY. By Jennifer Nedel-
sky.I Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. xiii, 
343. $29.95. 
Mark Tushnet 2 
Jennifer Nedelsky's long-awaited discussion of Federalist theo-
ries of property is a major contribution to the literature on the foun-
ders' political theory and its relation to contemporary constitutional 
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law. Taking a somewhat skeptical stance toward the so-called re-
publican revival, Nedelsky demonstrates that Federalists no less 
than Anti-Federalists understood the role of civic virtue in a consti-
tutional order predicated on private property. In terms suggestive 
of Charles Lindblom on corporations and democracy, though, she 
concludes that Madison ultimately failed to reconcile the political 
divisions inevitable in a private property regime with the demands 
of a democratic constitutional regime. 
Nedelsky's analysis is neo-Beardian. It is Beardian in insisting 
on private property's primacy at the founding. Madison's statement 
in Federalist 10, that "the protection of different and unequal facul-
ties of acquiring property" is "the first object of government," plays 
a central part in Nedelsky's analysis. In a Beardian vein, Nedelsky 
argues that the constitutional structure was designed to guarantee 
that a property-less majority could not tyrannize the propertied mi-
nority. Nedelsky's analysis is neo-Beardian, though, because unlike 
Beard she argues that the founders' concern for democratic tyranny 
arose from their commitment to political theory, not from their self-
interest narrowly defined. 
Nedelsky begins by offering a relatively standard account of 
Madison's political thought. Committed both to the republican 
principle of majority rule and to a private property regime that in-
evitably produced inequality and the passion for redistribution, 
Madison designed the Constitution's structures to hamper the re-
sentful, unpropertied majority's efforts to exploit the propertied mi-
nority. Nedelsky argues that Madison came to understand that 
property regimes were themselves the result of political choices, and 
that structural arrangements could not provide adequate support 
for private property. Judicial review, for Nedelsky, completes the 
Madisonian framework. The courts, outside politics, define the 
boundaries of the private property regime. 
The republican revival of recent years has stressed Anti-Feder-
alist challenges to Madison's analysis. One of Nedelsky's most im-
portant contributions is the demonstration that Federalists too saw 
difficulties in Madison's approach. A chapter on Gouverneur Mor-
ris presents a challenge to Madison that was both democratic and 
aristocratic. Like Madison, Morris believed that private property 
was central to the regime being created. Unlike Madison, Morris 
believed that, just as the unpropertied could threaten the liberties of 
the propertied, so the latter could threaten the liberties of the un-
propertied. In particular, they could influence the political process, 
using their wealth to assure that even the unpropertied would vote 
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for representatives primarily responsive to the interests of the 
propertied. 
Morris proposed a more extreme alternative than Madison's 
system of structural limits on government. For Madison, the con-
tention among factions in an extended republic protected private 
property. Morris argued that the protection of the propertied and 
unpropertied from each other had to be embedded in the constitu-
tional structure as well. He suggested that the Senate be the branch 
where the propertied would be represented, the House the branch 
for the unpropertied. In that way, Morris argued, each class would 
be able to protect itself against the other's incursions. 
Morris's plan was of course rejected. But, according to Nedel-
sky, the Madisonian constitutional framework did not adequately 
deal with Morris's concerns. Here Nedelsky joins scholars like 
Joyce Appleby, who are skeptical about the importance of the civic 
republican tradition to the founding generation. More precisely, 
Appleby argues that the founders were committed to a private prop-
erty regime whose dynamic was unappreciated by those influenced 
by the civic republican tradition. With the possible exception of a 
segment of the Southern slave-holding class, the founders rejected 
an economic system in which the landed gentry played a central 
part, in favor of a commercial republic in which private property 
had transformative effects. Madison understood that private prop-
erty in a commercial republic would always lead to actual inequal-
ity because of inequality in the capacity to acquire property. Yet, 
unlike Morris, he did not think it important to structure the govern-
ment to deal with the political consequences of actual inequality. 
Indeed, Nedelsky argues, Madison rejected another challenge 
from within the Federalist camp that emphasized those political 
consequences. A chapter on James Wilson presents the more com-
pletely democratic Federalist alternative to Madison. Madison's 
system, Nedelsky argues, would induce the unpropertied to abstain 
from political action, because politics could not give them what 
they most wanted. To Wilson, that undermined the democratic 
foundations of the republic. Nedelsky suggests that Wilson gave 
protection of property somewhat less priority than Madison. Her 
primary argument, though, is that Wilson agreed with Madison 
that laws confiscating private property were unjust, but believed 
that the evil could be averted better by encouraging rather than dis-
couraging democratic participation. By taking active part in gov-
ernment, Wilson argued, citizens-including the unpropertied-
would become more enlightened and would understand that confis-
cation was both unjust and against their long-term self-interest. 
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Nedelsky agrees with both Morris and Wilson in their critiques 
of Madison. The Madisonian framework, she argues, cannot re-
strain economic power's influence on politics and fails to encourage 
active citizen participation in politics. At the same time, though, 
she forthrightly rejects Morris's solution and somewhat more am-
bivalently rejects Wilson's. Morris wanted to preserve the founders' 
democratic commitments by squarely allocating democratic inter-
ests to the House. But Nedelsky argues Morris gave no reason to 
think that such a regime could effectively govern. On the other 
side, Wilson failed to appreciate the inevitable divisions between the 
propertied and unpropertied, optimistically assuming that these di-
visions could be overcome by a sense of common purpose and, per-
haps, long-term self-interest on both sides. Nedelsky does praise 
Wilson for his greater understanding of the importance of demo-
cratic participation as an expression of the citizenry's social 
capacities. 
Yet, if neither Morris nor Wilson provided an adequate alter-
native to the Madisonian framework, still that framework itself was 
problematic. Madison understood, in some unformed way, that pri-
vate property itself resulted from political choices, but his political 
theory rested on the unexamined proposition that property-which 
he generally took as a primitive, undefined term-was pre-political. 
The courts, and judicial review in particular, might protect this pre-
political property, but only if they themselves were outside politics. 
Nedelsky relies on George Haskins and Herbert Johnson's analysis 
of the Marshall Court to show that Marshall's lasting accomplish-
ment was the creation of a theory of adjudication that sharply sepa-
rated law and politics, and thereby completed the Madisonian 
framework. 
For a century and a half, the Supreme Court, as Nedelsky ar-
gues, upheld many incursions on private property under the head-
ing of the police power. These regulations expressed the democratic 
side of the Madisonian constitutional order, and, as Federalist theo-
rists feared, they did indeed undermine the property foundations of 
the regime. Starting with Oliver Wendell Holmes in the late nine-
teenth century, legal theorists began to notice that it was exceed-
ingly difficult to reconcile what the Court had approved with the 
idea that the definition of property was somehow pre-political. 
When the Court itself noticed the difficulty, the Lochner era began. 
The political problems the Court created for itself during that pe-
riod joined the jurisprudential debates to destroy forever, among 
legal theorists, the coherence of the Madisonian framework, at least 
insofar as it aimed at protecting private property. 
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Bringing her analysis to contemporary debates, Nedelsky asks 
whether something can still be made of the private property founda-
tions of the Madisonian system. In an acute analysis, she treats 
property as a central symbol of the permanent tension between indi-
vidualliberty and power, on the one side, and collective liberty and 
security, on the other. Yet, she argues, the symbol necessarily dis-
torts the reality because, at least in the Madisonian vision, inequal-
ity in property holdings is inherent in the idea of private property 
itself. The distortion appears, Nedelsky says, in recent Supreme 
Court decisions extending the reach of the contracts and takings 
clauses and limiting the ability of majorities to regulate campaign 
finance. 
Further, Nedelsky argues, we have begun to experience a gap 
between the rhetoric and the reality of the sanctity of property. 
Takings jurisprudence may have been revitalized by Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission,3 but the state's regulatory reach is so 
extensive that private property has lost much of its power to sym-
bolize a domain into which the majority may not intrude. And, as 
the "bundle of sticks" theory of property begins to penetrate public 
awareness, the symbolism weakens even more. 
In one of her most interesting excursions, Nedelsky examines 
recent efforts to mobilize the rhetoric of property on behalf of the 
poor. Her targets are Charles Reich's idea of the "new property" in 
welfare state entitlements, and some versions of the republican revi-
val. Nedelsky argues, persuasively in my view, that this strategy, 
while understandable, was unlikely to succeed. As she puts it, the 
positivism of Board of Regents v. Roth4 flowed almost inevitably 
from the idea of the "new property" itself. The rhetoric of property 
could not be disentangled, she suggests, from the idea of inequality 
with which it was associated in the Madisonian tradition. When the 
rhetoric of property was turned to redistributive ends, it generated a 
doctrinal limit-Roth's positivism-to capture the idea of 
inequality. 
Further, Nedelsky argues, even if proponents of "new prop-
erty" ideas had succeeded in separating the idea of property from 
the idea of inequality, as they surely wished, the results would have 
been disappointing. For, precisely because property was associated 
with inequality, the rhetoric of property would carry less force once 
it was separated from inequality: Its mythic quality, as Nedelsky 
puts it, rests importantly on its association with inequality. 
In her conclusion Nedelsky briefly sketches an alternative 
3. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
4. 408 u.s. 564 (1972). 
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political theory of a constitution. Throughout the book she argues 
that private property serves as an expression of the tension between 
individual and collective self-rule. Private property provides a do-
main within which each of us can choose how to live while simulta-
neously allowing us to operate independently in the public sphere (if 
we want to). Yet, because private property is not pre-political, its 
precise contours depend on collective decisions about how extensive 
that domain ought to be. Nedelsky suggests, in a sketchy discus-
sion, that we might "reshape constitutionalism" by focusing di-
rectly on human autonomy, making interdependence "the central 
fact of political life" so that "patterns of relationship ... develop 
and sustain both an enriching collective life and the scope for genu-
ine individual autonomy." She does not pretend that this sketch is 
a substitute for the Madisonian private property regime. She does 
insist, and I think properly, that political theorists need not accept 
private property as the sole expression of the tension between indi-
vidual and collective self-rule. 
Nedelsky's book is a provocative contribution to political and 
constitutional theory. Her readings of Madison, Morris, and Wil-
son are persuasive. Even if they do not sweep the field clear, anyone 
who addresses the property foundations of the constitutional order 
or takes part in the discussion of the republican revival will have to 
address Nedelsky's arguments. 
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The problems of arbitrariness and discrimination in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty have been the focus of a large body of 
litigation. Not unrelated to this constitutional contest, there has 
emerged a substantial body of published research on racial discrimi-
nation in the use of capital punishment. Death and Discrimination: 
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